National military strategy involves evaluating all elements of power, analyzing their capabilities and limitations, and incorporating these tools into a course of military action to secure political goals. A fast-growing industry in the U.S. and abroad is the sector that provides support for military operations in peace and war. The companies in this category provide everything from logistical services, to research and development, to the drafting of doctrine, to direct involvement in combat operations. The privatization and outsourcing of activities that were once solely the province of sovereign governments provide challenges and opportunities to planners and analysts involved in national security strategy. This paper will show that the trend toward privatization of military functions is sharply increasing in the United States and abroad, will point out some of the implications of the increase in defense contractor services, and will argue that the use of corporate personnel to augment U.S. armed forces acts as a force multiplier that is necessary, but not sufficient, to assure national security for the future.
prosperity." 1 The problem is that the United Nations is not equipped to provide the fast, cohesive, competent response required to counter hostile forces.
The number of forces deployed in peacekeeping operations on behalf of the UN stood at more than 75,000 in 1994, at a cost of $3.6 billion, of which about seventy percent was spent on operations in Europe. 2 This represented a sharp increase in activity compared to the first four decades of UN operations. The number dwindled to 12,000 personnel deployed in 1999, at a cost of $870 million, but appears to be on the rise again.
In April 2000, the UN General Assembly approved funds for new operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, and directed its advisory body to consider new ways of dividing the costs among member states.
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The nature of peacekeeping operations is also evolving. Before the end of the Cold War, the UN would deploy troops only after cease-fires, when the belligerent parties agreed to accept them. The international forces were to act impartially toward all those involved in the hostilities. Now, the UN is sending troops inside borders of sovereign states, into areas where there is no such consent for intervention and violence is still on-going, for "peace enforcement operations." The reason for this transformation is that the nature of war itself has changed.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, civilians made up fifteen percent of the casualties of war. Now, wars are fought not primarily between nations on battlefields, but among sectors of single populations, in streets and villages. Civilians account for ninety percent of those killed in conflict. 4 There is a new sense that a state's sovereignty does not provide it a justification to brutalize its own citizens with impunity. When effective action is possible to save populations at risk, even if the risk comes from their own leaders, there is a moral imperative to intervene.
The question is whether this unprecedented way of dealing with humanitarian disasters, given the resources available, will yield viable results. 
LET UNCLE SAM DO IT
The answer to these troubles has increasingly been the United States, the "globocop" or "911" provider of the new security age. It is a function about which many are uneasy, both in the U.S. and abroad. American military forces have been overly taxed by the proliferation of military operations other than war, which have increased in number since the fall of the Iron Curtain. In the wake of bipolarism, the U.S. has been thrust into the role of a world stabilizing force, but the price of leadership has been high for its troops.
In Kosovo, for example, more than 30,000 reservists and 1,000 warplanes were deployed against Belgrade's forces, the Navy diverted a carrier battle group from the Persian Gulf, and the Army sent 3,000 troops to support the Apache helicopter battalion in Albania. The Air Force ran dangerously low on the Joint Direct Attack Munition precision guided bomb and was forced to commit a third of its aerial tankers, in addition to electronic-warfare and ground-surveillance aircraft, to Operation Allied Force.
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According to DoD Doctrine, U.S. forces should be able to handle small-scale contingencies like Kosovo at the same time as it takes on two major theater wars. The pressure of just this one operation on personnel and armaments, however, created both morale problems among over-deployed troops and weapons shortages.
An All Volunteer Force meets this sharply increased operations tempo. It is a military greatly reduced in number since the days of the Vietnam draft. The services now face severe problems of recruitment and retention as they compete with a booming U.S.
economy. The All Volunteer Force has also led to higher logistics costs aimed at keeping soldiers and sailors well taken care of when deployed. 
THE REGIONAL APPROACH
Among the alternative approaches is a movement to empower others to handle their own affairs, on national or regional bases. This is founded on the recognition that "those states which have the most to lose from the breakdown of order in their neighborhood have the greatest incentive to preserve order" and thus should bear the responsibility of keeping peace in their regions. 10 To that end, the U.S. is providing stepped-up training and equipping to indigenous militaries and regional organizations in areas of conflict, rather than using American troops, to encourage local solutions for local problems. and assuming other duties that major state powers performed in the past. The thesis here is that, for good or ill, this phenomenon must be recognized and factored into calculations of national security strategy in the future. Security companies have provided vital protection of businesses and investments in wartorn areas from banditry throughout history. The fact that they are able to protect industries in besieged regions today allows those companies to function and the host countries to profit from foreign direct investment.
POSITIVE OUTCOMES PRIVATE FORCES CAN BRING

THE THREAT TO SECURITY PRIVATE FORCES MAY BRING
A compelling case can be argued, in counterpoint, that it would be naïve to ignore the potential dangers to national and international security raised by a proliferation of private military firms. In many cases, these companies signal a loss of control for the state. One of the fundamental defining aspects of sovereignty is that it confers the authority, within the bounds of international law, to use violence in defense of national More importantly, rulers were unable to resist the temptation to use these nonstate actors for their own ends. Since the fact that these entities were private gave the leaders plausible deniability, states could share the bounty when their efforts were successful, and deny knowledge of the operations when they failed. This ability to "authorize nonstate violence while they denied responsibility and accountability for its consequences" gave state rulers "maximum freedom with minimum responsibility," 16 a process that finally led to dangerous lack of constraints. Today, one of the defining characteristics of a corporate soldier is that they are hired when a crisis breaks out, and dismissed when it has passed. This allows leaders to distance themselves from their decision to hire private forces, particularly if the operations fail.
THE QUESTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE GENEVA PROTOCOLS
Accountability for violence and behavior during war is at the heart of the Geneva
Conventions, yet these protocols were written for sovereign states, not nonstate actors such as private military companies. There are a number of arguments against applying the criteria of Article 47 to private companies. It says that the individual must be recruited to fight in a specific conflict, but the employees of private military companies often work on a long-term basis and not for one situation only. In some cases, however, individuals are hired to work on a specific contract, which could muddy this argument.
The requirement that the individual take part directly in combat would also appear to exclude foreign advisers, trainers and technicians, even if their motive is financial gain.
ICRC commentary notes that "the increasingly perfected character of modern weapons, which have spread throughout the world at an ever-increasing rate, requires the presence of such specialists, either for the selection of military personnel, their training, or the correct maintenance of the weapons. As long as these experts do not take any direct part 17 However, the Argentine representative to the UN Security Council argued in 1982 that a valid analogy could be made between mercenaries and the Gurkha regiments of the British Army. "If captured, a contractor's status will depend on the type of conflict, applicability of any relevant international agreements, and the nature of the hostile force. When the United States is a participant in an international armed conflict, contractors are entitled to be protected as POWs if captured by a force that is a Geneva/Hague Convention signatory."
WHEN WAR MEANS JOB SECURITY
In some parts of the world, such as the former Soviet Union, thousands of displaced former combatants have formed security companies. In Ukraine, for example, continued economic turmoil has left former military personnel out of work. Several hundred are reported to have agreed to serve as mercenaries in the Caucasus and abroad.
Traveling under the guise of tourists, workers or specialists, they serve in regular military forces as well as in mercenary bands, despite the risk of incurring several legal penalties under Ukrainian law if caught and convicted. 22 In areas of social and political destabilization, mercenaries can be expected to flourish if policing and security apparatuses fail.
While few have openly ventured into engaging in actual combat, the threat that these firms could evolve into skilled, cohesive fighting organizations at odds with the state is conceivable. As one analyst expressed it: "I think the major worry that everyone has about this sort of thing is, will these forces become a force unto themselves, kind of To what extent could "officers of fortune," or today's "modem mercenaries" foment or perpetuate instability to generate contracts? There are two sides to the argument. Some say that military firms or contractors are motivated to maintain stable conditions in the countries in which they work in order to ensure the governments or industries that employ them will have the wherewithal to make the payments. On the other hand, an end to conflict could also mean an end to their contracts, so they might collude with local figures to keep the hot spots inflamed and maintain their employment. They could take it a step further, and foment conflict where none existed before in order to generate employment in lean times. The need to call on private forces may reveal fundamental flaws of governance.
ARMIES FOR HIRE
For weak regimes that must turn to private forces to stay in power because they cannot trust their own armies, there are issues of political legitimacy that may indicate the leaders should not be in power at all. For stable, developed states that must use corporate employees to carry out strategic goals, there may be a question of avoiding oversight.
For example, an administration could employ a company, rather than military personnel, to undertake missions that Congress might not approve. The use of private forces may also be a wake-up call that an imbalance exists between political ambitions and the resources available to achieve them at a reasonable cost to the citizenry. What may be needed is not private military companies, but a reassessment of ends and means, commitments and resources.
IS PRIVATIZATION OF SOME DEFENSE FUNCTIONS INEVITABLE?
Even with all these caveats, some increase in the privatization of the military in the U.S. and abroad may be inevitable, given the drop in induction of military personnel, the rise in their attrition rates, and the need for the kind of specialized, high-tech skills to win future wars that only private industry can afford to employ. The potential growth of information warfare and information operations, for example, is increasing the demand for technically skilled computer operators who are so well compensated in the corporate sector that they are leaving behind formerly attractive military careers. While the employment of mercenaries is an ancient occupation, the rapid rise of the wide spectrum of entrepreneurs in military services, ranging from individual "dogs of war" to respectable, well-organized and law-abiding corporations, is a new and powerful phenomenon. Its potential impact merits inclusion in our overall thinking about the evolving direction of national security strategy.
